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l use suLooking inside organizations at the different positions, expertise, and
autonomy of the actors, the authors use multisite ethnographic data
on safety practices to develop a typology of how the regulator, as the
focal actor in the regulatory process, is interpreted within organiza-
tions. The ﬁndings show that organizational actors express construc-
tions of the regulator as an ally, threat, and obstacle that vary with
organizational expertise, authority, and continuity of relationship be-
tween the organizationalmember and the regulator. The articlemakes
three contributions to the current understandings of organizational
governance and regulatory compliance, thereby extending both in-
stitutional and ecological accounts of organizations’ behavior with
respect to their environments. First, the authors document not only
variation across organizations but variable compliance within an or-
ganization. Second, the variations described do not derive from al-
ternative institutional logics, but from variations in positions, auton-
omy, and expertise within each organization. From their grounded
theory, the authors hypothesize that these constructions carry differ-
ential normative interpretations of regulation and probabilities for
compliance, and thus the third contribution, the typology, when cor-
related with organizational hierarchy provides the link between mi-
crolevel action and discourse and organizational performance.In what ways do social interactions within organizations inﬂuence com-
pliance with legal regulations? How do ground-level personnel, as the ac-AJS Volume 120 Number 1 (July 2014): 96–145
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Governing Inside the Organizationtors who perform day-to-day work, interpret and respond to laws designed
to specify and bound their work practices? To develop answers to these
questions, we adopt the empirically validated sociological understanding
that the organization is a patterned network of humans with distinct roles,
distributed authority, and varied expertise, that is, both a single collectivity
and many individuals embedded in an even larger network of transactions
and norms ðBlau 1962; Crozier and Thoenig 1976Þ. If organizational be-
havior is the outcome of coordinated action across the distributed actors,
how might variations across organizational actors inﬂuence an organiza-
tion’s capacity to govern itself and comply with legal rules?
Organizational governance refers to the capacity of an organization to
coordinate and channel its collective action. As such, organizational gover-
nance addresses phenomena within organizations that demand compliance
with norms concerning issues as speciﬁc as ﬁnancial disclosure, shareholder
value, and management compensation in publicly traded corporations to
general processes of bureaucratic control in chains of command in all or-
ganizations with divisions of labor ðWeber ½1903–17 1997; Edwards 1979Þ.
“Governance models are articulated systems of meaning that embody the
moral order as they explain and justify the proper allocation of power and
resources” ðFiss 2008, p. 291; see also Bendix 1956Þ. Since the mid-20th cen-
tury, minimal economic and bureaucratic norms have been supplemented
by extensive legislation regulating a wide array of matters, including hours
and wages; racial, gender, and age discrimination; workplace harassment;
as well as health and safety as prominent examples. Similarly, contempo-
rary research on organizational governance draws from a range of perspec-
tives, from a relatively narrow economic framing of governance as a set of
principal-agency problems related to compliance with and enforcement of
property contracts ðJensen andMeckling 1976; Famaand Jensen 1983;Hart
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Alnot limit governance processes to fundamental property rights. Whether we
conceive of organizational norms as a product of contracts, legislated regu-
lation, or institutional logics, however, the problem of organizational gov-
ernance and compliance is identical. How does a collectivity act as one to
achieve conformity with normative or legal requirements?2
From institutional and cultural perspectives, organizational governance
and normative conformity are understood as the consequence of “articu-
lated systems of meaning that embody the moral order,” both explaining
and justifying “the proper allocation of power and resources” across and
within organizations ðFiss 2008, p. 391Þ. “Emphasizing the symbolic nature
and cultural embeddedness of corporate governance” ðp. 391Þ, institutional
analysts focus on ideational systems and logics emerging from widely circu-
lating cultural schemas that provide legitimated templates for similar prac-
tices across organizations ðWuthnow and Witten 1988; Thornton 2004;
Lounsbury andCrumley 2007Þ, including, for example, such basic processes
as commensuration ðEspeland and Stevens 1998Þ and normalization of de-
viance ðVaughan 1996Þ. Although the system of circulating signs and prac-
tices we analyze as institution ðSelznick 1969Þ or culture ðSewell 1992Þ may
account for many similarities across organizations, researchers nonetheless
document widespread decoupling of organizational practices from institu-
tional norms whether legitimated through cultural schemas, professional
expertise, or legal coercion ðDiMaggio and Powell 1983Þ.
From a legal perspective, organizational governance is not a theoretical
issue of institutional or cultural homologies, but a fundamental question of
the practical effectiveness of law. Notably, studies that begin with an in-
terest in the effectiveness of law or consequences of regulation, what some
call a law-ﬁrst perspective ðSarat and Kearns 1993Þ, usually document a
gap between law on the books and law in action, not unlike institutional-
ists’ accounts of decoupling between institutional norms and organizational
practices ðMeyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991Þ or econo-
mists’ concernswithmisaligned incentives ðBebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann
2010Þ. Focused primarily on the performance of regulators in transactions
with regulated ﬁrms, studies pursuing a law-ﬁrst approach for the most part
also conceive of the regulated organization as a single entity. Consequently,
most of this research gives minimal attention to the ways in which action
within theorganization is coordinated toproduce, ignore, or resist compliance
with legal regulations ðBaldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2010Þ.
To explain the observed variations in governance and compliance across
organizations, we go inside organizations to examine how regulations are
experienced by organizational actors. We ﬁnd not only variations across2We draw on Black ð1976Þ here to refer to law as formal social control and nor-
mative regulation as informal social control.
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Governing Inside the Organizationorganizations but also variations in compliance within a single organiza-
tion. Drawing on relational sociology ðEmirbayer 1997Þ and ethnographic
data from three distinct ﬁelds ðtrucking, manufacturing, and scientiﬁc re-
searchÞ, we propose that differential patterns of transaction among the
actors in regulatory relationships inﬂuence how organizational actors ex-
perience and interpret regulators who serve as human conduits of legal reg-
ulation. Importantly, these variations are not a consequence of competing
institutional logics ðSauder 2008;Wakeham 2012Þ.We show howvariations
in the occupational positions of actors within organizations—distinguished
by autonomy, expertise, and frequency of interaction with regulators—in-
ﬂuence how these workers understand, negotiate, and enact compliance
with regulations and, in turn, how lawmay come to inhabit the organization
or may fail to become routine practice and as such fail to govern the orga-
nization ðcf. Gouldner 1954; Hallett and Ventresca 2006Þ. We join organi-
zational theory with sociolegal scholarship to explain the common obser-
vation of uneven and unpredictable compliance with law. Our grounded
theory suggests that the hierarchy of roles and positions within an organi-
zation—constituted by variations in autonomy, expertise, and the temporal
pace and duration of face-to-face engagements with regulators—has an ef-
fect on and may predict organizational compliance with legal regulations.
With this close observation of regulated practices in different organiza-
tional ﬁelds, we make three contributions to the current understandings of
organizational governance and regulatory compliance. First, we document
not only variation across organizations but variable compliance within an
organization. Second, although some observers have documented compet-
ing cultural logics within an organization ðHeimer 1999; Gray and Salole
2006; Sauder 2008Þ, the variations we describe do not derive from alter-
native institutional norms or logics, but from variations in positions, au-
tonomy, and expertise among actors within each organization. Thus, our
second contribution involves a renewed attention to organizational struc-
ture and hierarchy that seem to have been displaced in recent attention to
cultural schemas and institutionalized norms.
Following a synthesis of relevant literature and account of our research
methods in the next two sections, we show in the third section below how
actors continually engage in interpretive processes concerning the rele-
vance, competence, and power of regulators as they assess what constitutes
compliance with governing norms, whether they are obligations imposed
by legislated regulations, professional standards, or organizational rules.
We induce from the data generated in these different locations and orga-
nizations our third contribution: a typology of constructions of the regu-
lator by the regulated population. Across our studies, we observed three
variations in the ways actors interpret and enact their relationship with
regulators: ðaÞ regulator as threat, ðbÞ regulator as ally, and ðcÞ regulator as99
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Alobstacle. Variation in expertise, workplace autonomy, as well as the fre-
quency of interactions with and presence of the regulators seem to account
for the distribution of these interpretations among different organizational
actors. By reintroducing hierarchical variation into the analysis of organi-
zational compliance, the typology allows us to derive hypotheses concerning
variations in organizational governance. We hypothesize that these con-
structions carry differential normative implications and probabilities for
compliance, and thus our third contribution, the typology, when correlated
with different patterns of organizational hierarchy, provides the link be-
tween microlevel action and organizational performance. We offer these as
hypotheses for future research in the concluding section.SHIFTING FOCUS FROM REGULATION TO REGULATORS
TO THE REGULATED ACTORS INSIDE ORGANIZATIONS
Studies of regulatory enforcement have occupied scholars for a long while,
often as part of an effort to explain macroeconomic processes ðWilliamson
2000Þ, organizational homologies across institutional ﬁelds ðDiMaggio and
Powell 1983Þ, or the relationship between law on the books and law in
action ðPound 1910Þ. Taking the instrumentality of law quite seriously—
that law is not merely a symbolic articulation of general norms but a use of
state power for organizing social relations and producing speciﬁc condi-
tions—research has attempted to document the ways in which law suc-
ceeds or fails in its regulatory and governance missions.Variations across Organizations
An extensive body of literature, across several disciplines and professional
ﬁelds, argues that organizational compliance with regulations is uneven
and unpredictable ðe.g., Dobbin et al. 1988; Fligstein 1990; Edelman and
Suchman 1997; Heimer and Staffen 1998; Scott 2001; Kellogg 2009Þ. More
often than not, the literature has documented regulatory failure.3 The re-
search accounts for the variation in organizational compliance in terms of3Recent analysis suggests that regulation succeeds more than it fails and that re-
searchers have been neglecting the evidence of regulatory success ðe.g., safe drink-
ing water, inoculations for children, air transport safety, drugs that do not killÞ.
Looking at what may be the exceptional instances of failure, researchers may be
looking for the key under the proverbial streetlight ðHeimer 2012Þ. Sociologists of
law have noticed a similar attraction in much empirical research that attends to
normative failures and mistakenly generalizes from the cases of deviance to char-
acterize legal institutions and practices; in response, some researchers have devel-
oped methods to study the everyday, quotidian rather than deviant experiences of
legality ðEwick and Silbey 1998Þ.
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Governing Inside the Organizationthe styles and performance of the enforcement agents and agencies them-
selves ðBardach and Kagan 1982; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986; Gray
and Scholz 1993; Hutter 2001; May and Wood 2003Þ; national differences
ðVogel 1986; Gormley and Peters 1992Þ; philosophies ðMay and Burby
1998Þ; tactics, such as “bargaining and bluff” ðHawkins 1989Þ; or, in the
most extensive model, variation in responsiveness disciplined through a
hierarchy of increasingly punitive tactics ðAyres and Braithwaite 1992; cf.
Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; Parker and Nielsen 2011Þ.
Much effort has been devoted to explaining how agencies mandated to
serve the public become ineffective and indolent, often ending up serving
the very same organizational interests they were meant to control ðBern-
stein 1955; Kolko 1965; Shapiro 1968Þ. The explanations for poor enforce-
ment, and thus variable compliance, range from analyses of the symbolic
nature of the legislative process that produces inconsistent mandates ðEdel-
man 1964Þ and the inevitability of discretion ðKadish and Kadish 1973Þ to
analyses of the segmented structure of a political system that encourages a
division of the commonweal among interested parties to the exclusion of
the unorganized public ðLowi ½1969 1978Þ. Looking closely at enforcement
practices and strategies, observers document how individual regulators be-
come agents of clariﬁcation, speciﬁcation, and elaboration of their own au-
thorizing mandates by choosing among courses of action and inaction in
their relations with regulated ﬁrms. In the process of working through and
with legislative mandates, regulators cannot help but modify the goals they
were designed to serve ðSilbey 1980–81, 1984; Silbey and Bittner 1982;
Hawkins and Thomas 1984Þ.
When researchers focus on the regulated ﬁrm rather than the regulatory
agency, variations in compliance are explained by organizational motives,
capacities, and characteristics. In this line of work, studies describe sym-
bolic compliance with legal norms, looking legitimate ðEdelman 1992Þ; var-
iations in material and economic pressures ðSimpson and Rorie 2011Þ; the
environment of social pressures on the ﬁrm ðKagan andScholz 1984Þ; aswell
as moral commitments of the organization ðTyler 1990Þ. In one well-cited
study, the regulated organizations are categorized as either amoral calcula-
tors, political citizens, or organizational incompetents ðKagan and Scholz
1984Þ. A more recent study identiﬁes ﬁve different management styles that
respond to combinations of social, legal, and economic pressures; the styles
depict probabilities of organizational compliance arrayed along a continuum
from laggards and reluctant compliers to committed compliers and true be-
lievers ðGunningham, Kagan, and Thornton 2003Þ.4
4Pearce and Tombs ð1990Þ argue that these streams of typologies ðon the moti-
vations of ﬁrmsÞ are based on a promanagement bias that tends to ignore strati-
ﬁcation and issues of power within ﬁrms. For a rebuttal to Pearce and Tombs, see
Hawkins ð1990Þ. Refer to Gray ð2006Þ for a summary of this regulatory debate.
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AlAlthough studies of organizational misconduct and top management
leadership do recognize the importance of intraorganizational factors for
explaining organizational variations ðe.g., Clinard 1983; Daboub et al. 1995;
Simpson and Koper 1997; Smith, Simpson, and Huang 2007; Schaubroeck
et al. 2012Þ, studies focused on regulation and compliance less often take ac-
count of the stratiﬁcation of authority, expertise, or ability to comply within
organizations. Too rarely do they look at actors across the organization, up
and down its hierarchy, to trace the ways in which regulations come to in-
habit the organization ðHallett and Ventresca 2006Þ. One is hard pressed to
ﬁnd a reference to power, group interests, conﬂict, or inequality within the
regulated ﬁrm. This may be the most striking feature of the history of stud-
ies of regulatory compliance. Across too many of these studies, the regulated
organization is a black box, a singular unit of analysis, “theﬁrm,” represented
by a management that acts and speaks in its name ðKagan and Scholz
1984Þ. Perhaps because of access issues or the efﬁciency of simple explana-
tory models, studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance contribute
to the reiﬁcation of the organization and reproduction of the legal ﬁction of
the corporation as a person. The empirical studies report observations
made primarily during interactions between regulators and ﬁrm managers
and therefore do not show us what takes place beyond the visibility of the
regulator in the inner working life of the organization. By focusing on the
role of the regulator in achieving regulatory effectiveness, this body of re-
search has given less attention to the organizational dynamics that permit or
inhibit regulatory compliance ðcf. Turner and Gray 2009; Huising and Sil-
bey 2011Þ. Attending to the formal agents of law and formal organizational
representatives, researchers often miss the most predictable and thus pow-
erful aspects of law and legality: its habitual quotidian enactment, particu-
larly when the ofﬁcial agents of lawmay be absent and its coercive force less
visible.Variations within Organizations
Institutional and organizational research has, however, redirected obser-
vation from the ﬁrm qua ﬁrm to the ways in which organizations are sites
of competing institutional logics. As such, variations in compliance with
regulations or mandated changes are explained in terms of the availabil-
ity and accessibility of plural institutional logics and competing cultural
norms and schemas for actors within the organizations ðMarquis and Tilcik
2012; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012Þ. Research on institutional log-
ics across numerous ﬁelds, such as publishing in higher education ðThornton
and Ocasio 1999; Thornton 2004Þ, occupational prestige rankings ðZhou
2005Þ, stock market values ðZajac and Westphal 2004Þ, and French cuisine
ðRao, Monin, and Durand 2003Þ, supports the idea that there are “broad102
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Governing Inside the Organizationcultural beliefs and rules” that are always multiple but that nonetheless
“structure cognition and fundamentally shape decision making and action
in a ﬁeld” ðMarquis and Lounsbury 2007, p. 799Þ. Because the practical as
well as theoretical importance of institutional logics hinges on the idea that
these abstract cultural frameworks “are enacted at the interactional level in
day-to day organizational activity” ðMcPherson and Sauder 2013, p. 167Þ,
much work undertaken within this framework explores the ﬁrm as a net-
work of persons, actions, heterogeneous symbolic and material resources,
spaces, and times coordinated to achieve recognized purposes and interests.
Nonetheless, observed variations remain unexplained, for the most part.
The empirical accounts of organizational decoupling from institutional
norms offer such a diverse array of variables that identiﬁcation of an orga-
nizational or institutional mechanism becomes difﬁcult. Thus, the explana-
tions for why similar organizations respond differently to regulations—resist,
comply, or move beyond compliance—include managerial incentives, au-
thority and succession, subunit, competition, economic performance, age of
facilities, perceived risks and beneﬁts of noncompliance, top management
ethics and tone, offending history, and ﬁnally managerial experience with reg-
ulatory compliance systems ðDaboub et al. 1995; Howard-Grenville, Nash,
and Coglianese 2008Þ. Given the plurality of individuals, actions, resources,
spaces, and times as well as cultural norms and schemas that compose an
organization, the concept of organizational compliance as a singular con-
ceptualization ultimately breaks down, and the institutional puzzle of de-
coupling remains ðParker and Nielsen 2011Þ.
Nonetheless, this body of work offers insights on which we can build
to develop an alternative account of organizational governance. Clearly,
upper-level management plays an important role in securing compliance
ðSimpson and Koper 1997Þ, especially if the demands are consistent with
their professional identities ðRao et al. 2003Þ, the behavior of high-status
actors in their organizational ﬁeld ðRao, Monin, and Durand 2005Þ, and
their background preferences ðFligstein 1985Þ. Contemporary regulations
and managerial logics may also “responsibilize” workers, meaning that or-
ganizational actors are held individually responsible for speaking up and
enforcing regulation themselves ðGray 2006, 2009; Shamir 2008; Silbey
2009Þ. In addition,middle-levelmanagersmaybecomeadvocates of changes
consistent with regulations ðKelly 2003; Bendersky 2007; Dobbin and Kelly
2007Þ, when they are consistent with personal values ðTyler 2005Þ, andmay
increase their authority within the organization ðEdelman 1990; Dobbin,
Sutton, and Meyer 1993Þ. Noncompliance and illegality may ﬂourish, how-
ever, where middle-level managers bring a ﬁnancial orientation to the or-
ganization ðClinard 1983; Smith et al. 2007Þ. Regulatory compliance may
also demand changes in routines and habits and, as such, demand increased
resource commitments of time, energy, and personal authority from man-103
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Alagers ðDutton and Ashford 1993; Kalev and Dobbin 2006; Huising and
Silbey 2011Þ. “While adoption and strong support of new programs by
middle-level managers is important, it is but one step in the process of
changing institutionalized work practices. For real change to occur, subor-
dinate employees must actually . . . change their day-to-day work behav-
iors” ðKellogg 2009, p. 661Þ.
Recognizing the greater power of upper- and middle-level managers to
inﬂuence organizational compliance, research on organizational gover-
nance and regulatory compliance may nonetheless fail to recognize ade-
quately both the diminished power and unique resources of those in sub-
ordinate positions in ﬁrms ðEdwards 1979; Hodson 2001; Gray 2002Þ. Both
Vaughan ð1996, 2003Þ and Perin ð2006Þ refer at length to the dysfunctional
consequences of the hierarchical credibility gap in organizational gover-
nance ðe.g., in pursuing safetyÞ, a gap that derives from embedded but un-
acknowledged stratiﬁcation rather than rules or norms. Lower-level actors
are often repositories of critical information and counter hegemonic views,
and yet they are often unable to persuade those higher up in the organi-
zation of either the credibility of their knowledge or the relevance of their
perspectives for safety or other regulatory goals. Moreover, most individu-
als inside an organization never see or experience a direct interaction with
a regulator, notwithstanding that organizational compliance usually re-
quires coordinated action at all levels of the organization, and especially
at the ground level of service and production. Yet, the frontline workers,
whose activities most often produce violations or compliance, have only
recently been incorporated into the literature on regulatory enforcement.
To ﬁll this lacuna in our understanding of the practices of organizational
governance, that is, to explain how organizations facing similar regula-
tory schemes and institutional pressures respond differently, we draw from
recent work suggesting that rather than dictating the behavior of actors,
institutional logics more closely resemble tools that can be brought out to
solve dilemmas and break impasses among organizational groups. “The
same logic, for example, could be used in different situations to achieve
opposite goals, and the same actor may choose to employ different logics at
different times depending on the perceived needs of the immediate situa-
tion” ðMcPherson and Sauder 2013, pp. 167, 165Þ. Similarly, in a study of
juvenile sentencing decisions in which an array of competing professional
frameworks and interpretations of the child, the crime, and the sentence
must be resolved to achieve agreement on the sentence, Wakeham ð2012Þ
suggests that competing logics are not resolved at all but accumulated as
layers of justiﬁcation for a surface agreement in a negotiated sentence. Re-
lying on Goffman’s ð1967Þ notions of deference and ritual performance, as
well as American pragmatism, Wakeham shows that coordinated social ac-
tion can happen even in the absence of cognitive or normative agreement,104
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Governing Inside the Organizationor deep, shared, understanding among the actors involved. In other words,
organizational actors can agree to act without agreeing as to why, without
shared institutional logics. These authors suggest that actors possess a great
deal of discretion in choosing which logics they use and how they use these
chosen logics.
Notably, the organizations we observed, and the particular regulations
and rules on which we focused, are not examples of organizations with
competing institutional logics. We observed workers in a steel plant, inde-
pendent and ﬁrm truck drivers, and scientists ðlab technicians, students,
professorsÞ in university laboratories. Across these three ﬁelds, the safety,
health, and environmental regulations about which we report were always
subordinate to the dominant institutional logics of proﬁt that prevailed in
manufacturing and trucking and knowledge production that prevailed as
the grounds of professional status in science. Using standard sociological
concepts for organizational hierarchy ðauthority, autonomy, expertise, re-
source availability, and control of time and space, which we discuss be-
lowÞ, we analyzed our interview and observational data to map our sub-
jects’ experiences and interpretations of regulation. From these experiences
and interpretations, we develop a typology of regulatory transactions that
acknowledges the heterogeneous contributions from actors at all levels of
the organization. Although we cannot produce substantiating data within
the scope of this article, we hypothesize relationships between the actors’
constructions of the regulator and the patterns of compliance. In other
words, the often observed and reported institutional decoupling may be a
consequence of organizational variations in terms of regulated actors’ au-
tonomy, expertise, and familiarity with the regulators rather than compet-
ing institutional logics. Organizations may have small, subtle, or signiﬁcant
variations in the ways in which work is allocated internally while none-
theless sharing membership in an institutional ﬁeld.COLLECTING ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS’ ACCOUNTS
OF REGULATORS
Beginning with the observation that regulatory enforcement ðor compli-
anceÞ takes place through transactions among regulatory agents and or-
ganizational actors, we analyzed ethnographic data we had collected in
several ﬁeldwork projects designed to study safety practices in university
laboratories, an industrial factory involved in automotive and steel pro-
duction, and trucking. This mixture of case studies provides cross-case
comparisons of meaning-making processes at the ground level within or-
ganizations, across the range of positions within the organizations, and
across three occupational ﬁelds. We chose these sites because they include
sites that are both typical cases for studying enforcement of safety regula-105
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Altions ðfactoryÞ and a rare case for studying regulatory enforcement ðuni-
versity laboratoriesÞ but one with sites of intractable governance ðHuising
and Silbey 2013Þ, which might nonetheless be common in many other or-
ganizations ðVan Velsen ½1967 1978; Small 2004Þ. We included the data
from our interviews with truckers because individual entrepreneurs or em-
ployees who work in isolation from others or managerial observers have
also been studied less often.
We make no claim that these organizations were selected randomly or
constitute a representative sample of contemporary workplaces. We hoped
that this range of cases would offer sufﬁcient variation to induce some hy-
potheses concerning organizational actors’ interpretations of regulators.
Following Trost ð1986Þ and Small ð2009Þ, our cases offer a range of vari-
ation in what we anticipate will be distinguishing conditions for regula-
tory transactions. Both the factory and the university are formally orga-
nized bureaucracies with varying degrees of hierarchy, and thus variations
in authority and autonomy, which we assumed at the outset might inﬂu-
ence organizational actors’ interpretations of regulation and regulators.We
had not originally posited that expertise and frequency of interactions with
regulators would have the inﬂuence we ultimately observed.
These distinct projects took place in Canada and the United States be-
tween 2001 and 2010. In the factory project, an in-depth ﬁve-month eth-
nography was conducted inside a unionized steel extrusion plant in Can-
ada. Over 1,000 hours of ﬁeldwork, sometimes seven days aweek, and often
with abundant overtime, was undertaken by Garry Gray, who was em-
ployed as a production worker during a period of ﬁve months. During this
ﬁeldwork, observations of a variety of departments were conducted in or-
der to take into account differences in work-group cultures as well as the
varying compositions of workers in each group. The ethnography was spe-
ciﬁcally undertaken to understand how health and safety regulation is ex-
perienced and shaped in the course of routine production in the factory. A
publicly traded corporation that has been bought and sold several times in
the last decade, it is managed locally on-site by a president and general man-
ager. The factory is subject to labor, environmental, and employment regu-
lations in Canada, which are periodically subjects of onsite inspection. More
often, the plant is audited for compliance with industry standards. Frontline
workers make little distinction between private and public inspectors.
Each subunit in the factory ðe.g., sheet milling, auto parts, tubing, re-
ceiving, shippingÞ has a supervisor ðhistorically known as the unit fore-
manÞ.Within each division or subunit there are teams of unionizedworkers,
one of whom serves as the team leader. Team leaders, although union-
ized laborers, function asmiddle-level mediators betweenmanagement and
subordinate workers; team leaders rotate in and out of these positions and106
This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 04, 2016 10:35:45 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Governing Inside the Organizationdo not occupy them permanently. The team personnel—production work-
ers—are of three ranks: students or temporary workers come and go with
seasonal and business cycles and are not part of the union; junior union
workers are assigned to teams and divisions by management; and senior
unionmembers bid on the division and teamwhere theywould like towork.
Unlike newer or junior production workers, a bid-operator has greater au-
thority and expertise and when confronting a manager or inspector is more
likely to be listened to because bid status, rather than occupation, secures
the particular organizational position. The bid-operator cannot be moved
to another job and replaced with someone who might be more malleable
or subordinate, who will follow orders more consistently, either to achieve
safety or to avoid complaints about unsafe work. However, the small
amount of control bid-operators do possess is limited to the particular job
they have achieved through the bid. In addition, the union includes skilled
trade workers such as tool-and-die makers, electricians, and millwrights.
They are regarded as highly expert craftspersons. Thus, authority and au-
tonomy among factory workers varies and is not coincident with their oc-
cupation ðGray 2002, 2011Þ.
In the trucking study, one-on-one interviews were conducted with 158
truck drivers at three different truck stops in the United States ðtwo in
Massachusetts, one in ConnecticutÞ. The 158 drivers were from 68 dif-
ferent trucking companies ð128 drivers were corporate drivers, and the re-
maining 30 were owner-operator truck driversÞ. The sample consisted of
truck drivers living in 30 different states and three Canadian provinces.
The majority of drivers indicated they were long-haul drivers ð69%Þ who
are on the road, away from home, longer than one week at a time. The
project was designed to determine the ways in which truck drivers inter-
pret and respond to safety regulations, experiences of threat and violence
to themselves, and ways in which their work intersects with other driv-
ers and road conditions—what we might call the culture of the road. Com-
pany drivers are employees of a trucking ﬁrm; they receive their assign-
ments from a dispatcher daily, weekly, or at longer intervals depending on
whether they are a long-haul driver who may be away from home base
two to three weeks at a time ð69% of the sampleÞ, a regional driver who
might be away two to three days a week ð26.7% of the sampleÞ, or a local
driver, who is generally home every evening and makes numerous client
stops throughout his work shift ð4.3%Þ. Clearly, drivers who are out on
the road for days and weeks at a time have greater autonomy. Expertise
and frequency of transactions with inspectors, however, may vary greatly
among the drivers as a consequence of local trafﬁc patterns, highway con-
ditions, as well as climate and weather. Owner-operators, responsible only
to themselves as well as the legal rules, keep logs only for the inspectors and107
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Alneed not worry about oversight by the company dispatchers and manag-
ers. However, owner-operators are small businessmen, holding themselves
more directly accountable to the client whose repeat business they seek
and require. Company drivers are employees experiencing more levels of
oversight and monitoring, whose relationships with clients are mediated
by the dispatcher and ﬁrmmanagement. The world of lone work represents
a unique sphere within workplace relations that has received relatively
little attention. In this way, the truckers are quite different from the factory
or laboratory workers we study, for whom production is always dependent
on the coordinated labor of various others. Importantly, most drivers work
alone in their trucks, although some do work in teams for heavy deliveries
for which the receiving or sending organization does not provide the lifting
power. They make periodic stops at locations to pick up and deliver goods.
Rather than assume homogeneity among all truck drivers or among lone
workers, we examine variation among and within these workers.5 Truck-
ers are governed by myriad public regulations concerning the condition of
the vehicle, the length of the workday, and the rules of the road, which
cumulate to produce an experience of hyperregulation.
Finally, from 2001 through 2007, Silbey conducted, with a team of col-
laborators, ethnographic ﬁeldwork at a university in the eastern United
States to document and analyze the creation and implementation of an
environmental health and safety management system for the university’s
research laboratories. Additional ﬁeldwork was conducted in laboratories
in a second university. The ﬁeldwork activities included observation, in-
terviews, and document collection. It was supplemented by data collection
with standardized instruments for some observations and via surveys of
lab personnel and environmental management staff. Data about how uni-
versity personnel ðprofessors, doctoral and postdoctoral students, under-
graduates, lab technicians, and administratorsÞ experience and interpret
safety are taken from ﬁeld notes and interviews. Each researcher on the
team observed and recorded the design and introduction of the manage-
ment system from the perspective of one or more of the different groups of
actors: scientists in several science and engineering departments, adminis-
trators ðwithin and across departmentsÞ, environmental and safety spe-5Because we studied drivers across 68 ﬁrms and 30 individual owners, this project
is not exactly analogous to the factory or the university. We cannot say how the
data would vary if we looked at only one large trucking ﬁrm. Our sense, however,
is that having drivers from multiple ﬁrms, whose organizational structures may
vary somewhat, provides more valid accounts of the drivers’ experiences across
that variation.
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Governing Inside the Organizationcialists, and information technology designers. Some observed committee
meetings in which the system was being designed; others worked in labo-
ratories and waited for the changes planned at the meetings to trickle down
through the coordinators into the academic departments and laboratories.
We met weekly to share observations and to read and code notes and in-
terview transcripts, producing, discussing, and revising synthetic and in-
terpretive memos. Our notes were shared using Atlas.ti. For laboratory
scientists, regulations are imposed by the university aswell as by local, state,
and federal governments. Each of these public agencies may send inspec-
tors at any time, although they almost always give notice beforehand.
Within the university, compliance with public regulations as well as uni-
versity rules are the responsibility of specialized administrative staff who
are regarded by lab personnel as internal regulators.
Across all research settings, informal interviews were also conducted
with workers while they were at work or, in the case of the truckers, while
they were visiting truck stops. The informal interviews were designed to
probe informants’ interpretations of events that were taking place in their
work setting at the time of the interview. They also allowed us to differ-
entiate the capacities and constraints attached to the different roles of the
actors inside these organizations. We rarely asked speciﬁcally about reg-
ulations and certainly did not begin or focus our interviews on governing
procedures. We asked about how the work is done, problems and successes
in the work, and the ways in which this actor’s work was the same as or
different from that of others. We asked what was satisfying and what
was frustrating. Out of these conversations, we learned about the actor’s
apprehension of and interpretations of governing rules and procedures.
Within the different organizations, few persons—with the exception of
faculty scientists—were able to act with freedom and autonomy relatively
unconstrained by formal rules. Rather, the majority of individuals inside
the organizations derived authority from their expertise and organizational
role ðsee table 1Þ. This categorization of organizational actors by auton-
omy/authority is useful given the lack of research exploring how actors
inside organizations conceptualize regulators. However, even within an oc-
cupation, such as a productionworker in the factory or truck driver, variation
in authority appears. Because variations were noted within occupations and
also across organizational positions, we hypothesize that it is the relative au-
tonomy and expertise that inﬂuences interpretations of regulations and reg-
ulators rather than particular occupations per se.
The data reported and analyzed in this article were collected as part of
the three distinct ﬁeldwork projects on the legal regulation of work and
science. Conversations between the authors about our various projects
suggested that we were independently observing similar phenomena across109
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Governing Inside the Organizationour different projects.6 Therefore, we used the interviews and ﬁeld notes
from the three cases to make one large data set in which to search for
organizational actors’ interpretations of the regulators. Although each of
the projects began with an interest in regulatory enforcement and com-
pliance, and variations in organizational governance more generally, we
did not originally focus the studies on the issues of hierarchy, autonomy,
and expertise; nor would we ever ask speciﬁcally about such issues because
they would as likely as not generate formulaic answers legitimated in
popular culture. However, since we are sociologists of organizations and
law, these concepts are never absent from our work. The virtue of in-depth
ﬁeldwork and data analysis using the model of grounded theory is the
opportunity for surprises the researcher did not anticipate; the analysis is
iterative and is repeated as hypotheses appear from reading the transcripts
and notes to develop inductive codes in response to the text rather than
predetermined topics and concepts ðGlaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz
2006Þ. Although we did not ask a speciﬁc question, for example, about
whether an actor’s expertise, or positional authority, affected interactions
with inspectors and supervisory personnel—and would be unlikely ever
to pose a question in quite such a direct manner—we did inquire about the
way work is done. For example, what problems and challenges have you
encountered in your work? What is working well in your job? What is not
going so well? We repeatedly ask for examples, elaborations, and stories
that allow interviewees to talk about all sorts of matters that are part of
doing their work. In the course of describing how the work is done and
helping the interviewee to walk through a day’s work, repeatedly asking
for clariﬁcations and descriptions of materials, persons, and events, a great
deal of information is conveyed beyond the originally posed question
ðMishler 1986Þ.
The analysis of the ﬁeld notes and interviews began from our general
understanding of the literatures on the sociology of organizations gener-
ally and on regulation in particular. We collected all references to and de-
scriptions of regulators and regulations by organizational actors. Because
the projects had individually begun with general interests in the ways
regulation is experienced in the workplace, it was not difﬁcult to piece the6Unlike the much heralded practice of multisited ethnography in which one re-
searcher exits the “conventional single-site location . . . to multiple sites of obser-
vation and participation” ðMarcus 1995, p. 95Þ or the classic model in which a team
observes and interviews in the same organization ðGouldner 1954; Becker et al.
1961; Huising and Silbey 2011, 2013Þ, this project adopts a third variation on eth-
nographic practice. We interviewed and observed independently and then col-
laboratively discussed and analyzed the data. Because the data developed from
three distinct ethnographies, with different research designs and multiple research-
ers, they offer a methodological extension on multisited ethnography.
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Aldata together. We worked with three separate data ﬁles, one for each proj-
ect, and searched across the three sets of inductively created codes for ref-
erences to regulators, inspectors, regulations, audits, visits, and so forth.
We adopted Ewick and Silbey’s ð1998, 2003Þ four dimensions of social
action ði.e., normativity, capacity, constraint, and time/spaceÞ as categories
with which to analyze the variations in the actor’s accounts. Table 2 dis-
plays the questions we used to analyze our ﬁeld notes and interviews as
well as the results and typology of interpretations. The goal of the analysis
was to discover the various ways in which our participants across these
sites ðtruckers, factory workers, and university laboratory workersÞ ex-
press and interpret their relationships to legal regulations and regulators,
speciﬁcally, the regulations governing their workplaces and practices. Al-
though originally articulated within a study of law and legality in everyday
life, Ewick and Silbey ð1998Þ develop a standard frame for analyzing in-
stitutional logics by organizing actors’ representations in terms of the ba-
sic units or categories of social action as deployed in sociological theory
ðagain, normativity, capacity, constraint, and time/spaceÞ. Acknowledging
that competent social actors also “do sociology,” if not alongside, in addi-
tion to professional sociologists ðGarﬁnkel 1964, p. 250Þ, the memes, lan-
guage, and discourses that members of society use can be categorized and
analyzed within the concepts sociologists have developed to name forms of
social action. As ordinary citizens, going about our daily lives, we operate
on the basis of understandings of how and why people behave as they do
and of how and why things happen. We are constantly testing and revising
our practical, lay theories against our observations and experiences, even
as we interpret those observed events and experiences in the context of
our theories. Garﬁnkel noted the critical role of such practical, rather than
professional, theories in both sustaining social order and generating resis-
tance. Ewick and Silbey ð2003Þ suggest that by analyzing and organizing
cultural discourses within these fundamental sociological concepts, or what
they refer to as dimensions of cultural schemas and narratives, we have at
hand a means of furthering a social science of culture: making explicit the
lenses sociologists and other social scientists use for categorization, and in
this way provide more reliable grounds for valid comparison and gener-
alization across cases and empirical projects.7
We interpret our respondents’ accounts in terms of these four analyti-
cally distinguishable dimensions of social action. These dimensions should
be understood as axes of interpretation that provide alternative van-
tage points from which to view, and thus depict, actors’ relations with and7Ewick and Silbey ð1998, p. 82Þ describe these dimensions as both empirically in-
duced and logically deduced categories, developed interactively by analyzing tran-
scripts and social theory. Maxwell ð1992Þ offers ﬁve criteria for achieving validity
and understanding in qualitative analysis.
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Alinterpretations of regulation and organizational governance. Normativity
refers to the values and moral legitimations attributed to persons, events,
places, and organizations, the accounts actors provide about the way things
should be. Actors also refer to theways inwhich their own or others’ actions
actually occur, including how they are constrained by the actions of oth-
ers or available resources; such references are collected under the dimension
of constraint and in social theory are often discussed under the rubric of
structure. Because structure is not entirely determinative, social actors also
recognize and speak about their own and others’ capacities to shape ac-
tion, human agency ðSewell 1992Þ. Finally, in addition to normativity, con-
straint, and capacity, social action is organized by time and occupies space
ðGiddens 1984Þ. In sum, these dimensions are not variables or textual codes;
they are analytic composites aggregating several or many codes rather than
ground-level phenomena or observations.
Using these dimensions to correlate data in the coded texts and across
actors and settings, we identiﬁed three distinct accounts of the regulator: as
a threat to the person and his or her employment, as an ally in the organi-
zation’s production, and as an obstacle to efﬁcient and innovative work
ðtable 2Þ. With this typology in place, we then focused our analysis on the
speciﬁc relationships with regulators, as we observed in our notes that
these relationships seemed to vary. We then began to sort the observations
and comments by the role of the actors and noticed that their organiza-
tional location or autonomy, expertise, and frequency of interaction with
the regulators seemed to correlate with different interpretations of the reg-
ulations.
We use standard deﬁnitions of our central terms: authority, autonomy,
expertise, and frequency of interaction. In a synthesis of much literature
and an expansion of Weber’s deﬁnition of authority as the legitimate ex-
ercise of power in a transaction, Wrong ð1995Þ deﬁnes authority as the
ability to command ðachieving intended and foreseen effects in a relation-
ship with othersÞ on the basis of resources to which the subordinate party
in the relationship defers: knowledge or expertise, position in an organi-
zational hierarchy, threats of violence or constraint ðcoercionÞ, promises of
reward ðinducedÞ, or personality ðlove or charismaÞ.8 Although expertise
was historically established by exclusive education, by the end of the 20th
century the meaning of expertise became diluted and assertions common-8Types of power other than authority discussed by Wrong ð1995Þ include force,
manipulation, and persuasion. Following Bachrach and Baratz ð1970Þ, Lukes
ð1974, 1986Þ deﬁned power in terms of decision-making capacity, ability to thwart
decisions or non–decision making, but added a third dimension in terms of ideo-
logical or what we might call cultural framing so as to shape discourse and action.
Following primarilyWeber andWrong, we refer here only to legitimate exercises of
power on the basis of subordinates’ deference to requests or commands.
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Governing Inside the Organizationplace ðAbbott 1988Þ. Inmost contemporary circulating deﬁnitions, expertise
can be established by individual demonstrations of skill, but it is gener-
ally reserved for professionals whose knowledge base—established through
formal training and ability to exercise discretion as communicated through
licensing—is offered for sale speciﬁcally on the basis of claims to that ex-
pertise ðLarson 1977; Abbott 1988Þ. We use the term autonomy to refer to
the capacity for self-governance, free of constraint “imposed by an outside
agency” ðWeber 1947, p. 148Þ. Of course, no socialized actors are entirely
autonomous, and this applies, even more so, to organizational actors. Thus
we use the term relatively so that some organizational actors have more
imposed constraint, monitoring, and review than do others. Their vulner-
ability to the judgments of others on the quality or quantity of work is sim-
ilarly constrained. Finally, we use frequency of interaction with regulators
in a straightforward numerical sense.
We present the inductively produced typology in the next section and
hypotheses concerning variation by organizational position and experience
in the discussion section.INTERPRETING/CONSTRUCTING THE REGULATOR
Across three different research sites, we observed that employees within the
same organization interpreted the nature of the regulator’s capacity and
role in very different ways. However, we also noticed similar variations in
the ways in which regulators were constructed by organizational actors
occupying similar statuses across the different organizations. While some
employees sought feedback from regulators on compliance strategies, re-
garding ðor at least interacting withÞ regulators as allies in the production
and compliance processes, others were defensive and cautious, as though
the relationship was fundamentally adversarial, a threat either to the or-
ganization or to their own employment security. Some organizational mem-
bers interacted infrequently with the regulators, often regarding the in-
spectors as relatively incompetent obstacles to their productivity. Regulators
were sometimes seen as barriers to both production and compliance, in the
sense that they lacked sufﬁcient expertise to understand the work processes
that they were regulating. By exploring constructions of the regulator from
the perspective of the organizational actors, what can we learn about how
organizational governance and regulatory compliance are performed day to
day?
On the basis of our inductive analysis of the data from the three sites,
we developed a typology of the regulator to depict the observed variations
in the ways in which regulators are interpreted by organizational actors.
As illustrated in table 2, the typology identiﬁes three common variations:
ðaÞ regulator as threat, ðbÞ regulator as ally, and ðcÞ regulator as obstacle.115
This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 04, 2016 10:35:45 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
AlThese constructions of the regulator are characterized by variations in the
interpretations of the regulators’ normative role, capacity ðexpertise, credi-
bility, and knowledgeÞ, constraints, and pattern of interaction ðtime/spaceÞ
with organizational actors.
The sections that follow use the dimensions of social action to organize
the data from the case studies to identify the three most common interpre-
tations of regulators that we observed among organizational actors within
and across organizational settings.Regulator as Threat
Often, frontline individuals in an organization know very little about reg-
ulators. Most of their experience with legal regulation stems from what
is gleaned during informal workplace conversations, that is, “water cooler
talk” or “banana time” ðRoy 1959Þ. In most cases, the result is an implicit
sense that an inspector poses a threat to one’s employer and thus indirectly
to one’s own job status.9 Sometimes, however, the danger is experienced as
direct: the individual fears that she or he will be held personally responsi-
ble for regulatory noncompliance. Across organizational settings, regulators
are routinely perceived as potentially threatening to the daily practices of
work, no less to the ﬁnancial and legal status of the organization. Indeed,
inspectors are often described as seeking evidence only of noncompliance,
of being preoccupied with issuing citations or other forms of punishment.
They are seen as having a limited tool kit with which to secure compliance
to legal rules and thus to meet the public interest embodied in their legal
mandate. The academic literature on regulatory compliance often describes
organizational compliance practices as primarily efforts to avoid sanction.
This construction of the regulator as a punitive threat is also one of the
most common characterizations invoked in public political debates by those
opposed to government regulation of business or government standard set-
ting as ameans of promoting responsible organizational performance.When
the regulator is interpreted as a threat, compliance is understood to be like
a compliance check on a computer, a process that demands perfect corre-
spondencewith ostensibly objective criteria, as opposed to a thermostat that
maintains variation within limits. Here, compliance demands conformity
because variation implies deviance, unacceptable difference rather than var-
iation around a norm.
The construction of the regulator as a threat leads to individual and
organizational efforts to “look compliant,” regardless of whether or not the
appearance of compliance corresponds to the espoused goals of regulation9We use the word inspector interchangeably with regulator to refer to the regulator
who visits a workplace site.
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illustrated across our collective research settings and is often evidenced by
extraordinary efforts to perform in the presence of and for the regulators,
perhaps more often when the organizational actor is less familiar with
the regulators or has less autonomy or expertise. These performances are
choreographed to offer a particular, unvarying, compliant presentation of
self among the regulated, one that can resemble during inspection visita-
tions, for instance, what Gray ð2006, p. 885Þ terms “Potemkin villages.”
Drawn from the history of 19th-century tsarist Russia, Potemkin villages
were fake settlements erected to impress the Empress Catherine II with
the value of her new possessions along the desolate banks of the Dnieper
River and the competence of her minister, Gregory Potemkin, responsible
for the region. As momentary facades whereby organizational actors at all
levels temporarily feign compliance during visits by outsiders, Potemkin
villages perform amock conformity reminiscent of AlvinGouldner’s ð1954Þ
notion of mock bureaucracy whereby rules are ignored in practice except
for times “when the inspector comes around” ðp. 18Þ. Just as in Gogol’s
classic drama The Inspector General and the Hollywood ﬁlm of that name,
where the local residents and managers of a small town react with terror
to the news that one of the tsar’s inspectors will be arriving to investigate
them, some organizational actors respond to regulators, richly endowed by
ofﬁcial status and legal technicalities, with fear and sometimes loathing.
The hazard of expected punishment induces organizational actors to pro-
duce the evidence they believe regulators require.
During ﬁeld research at the industrial steel and automotive factory, Po-
temkin villages were observed to be routinely created during outsider tours
and then shortly thereafter dismantled. The ﬁrst time this was observed,
Garry Gray had arrived at the factory to be surprised by a transformed
workplace. Most of the safety-related aspects had been reversed from their
normal state: the building was clean ðno oil or spills on the ﬂoorÞ, all the
machines carried their proper safety guards, lock-out procedures that en-
sure equipment turns off when workers are too close were in place, and
workers were wearing protective equipment. It seemed as if all the safety
rules were being followed to perfection. In other words, without warning,
it suddenly appeared that the organizational culture had completely re-
versed from what Gray had observed during his ﬁrst few weeks of ﬁeld-
work.
When Gray arrived at work the following day, he found that the safety
practices had reverted to normal, that is, the conditions he had been ob-
serving since he began the project: safety guards had been removed from
the machines, oil spills again dotted the ﬂoors, protective equipment was
hanging by the lockers, and so forth. During lunch break, he inquired about
these transformations and reversals. “Yesterday was a tour day,” he was117
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Altold. Another worker commented, “They ½managementmademe ﬁll out all
the ½safety sheets saying yes I have been trained.”WhenGray inquiredwhy
the worker went along with looking compliant when, in fact, he had not
received any safety training, the worker stated, “I don’t want to be the guy
who screws up and causes 450 people to lose their job.”He further revealed
that while the inspector was asking questions of workers at the front of his
line, his supervisor came up to him and said, “They are probably going to
come down here and ask you a question.” The supervisor then proceeded
to tell him both the question and how he should answer it. The visitors’
tour created an incentive for management to ensure that the machines and
workers and shop ﬂoor operated in textbook fashion. Over the course of
the ﬁve months of the study, Gray learned that Potemkin villages were the
routine way in which regulatory inspections or outsider visits were man-
aged. After some time, Gray no longer experienced these breaks as sur-
prising behavioral and physical inversions, but rather as themselves part of
the normal effort to “look compliant when necessary.”
Potemkin villages were similarly observed during the study of the uni-
versity laboratories. Laboratory workers were observed to aggressively
clean and straighten the labs in anticipation of semiannual inspections.
Some of this laboratory housecleaning was so frantic that it not infre-
quently led to accidents. For instance, in the process of hastily dealing with
waste before the inspectors arrived ðwaste must be appropriately capped,
labeled, and put into designated holding areasÞ, highly reactive chemi-
cals that must be stored separately were occasionally poured into a single
container, with consequently uncontrolled reactions with noxious fumes
that took hours to subside or sometimes led to small explosions. Regulators
were viewed as threats by lab technicians, who, lacking autonomy, secure
position, or advanced degrees, occupy the lowest ranks in the laboratory
hierarchy and routinely perform scripted and repetitive procedures ðEvans
2010Þ.1010University research laboratories are populated by status-ranked personnel, with
undergraduate students occupying the lowest rank followed by graduate students
and postdoctoral fellows working for and under faculty members who assume re-
sponsibility for what takes place within the laboratory. Many laboratories also
contain paid staff, including technicians and one or more managers, who allocate
lab benches, desks, and work assignments, coordinate ordering and distribution of
supplies, and generally oversee the laboratory organization. Technicians provide
assistance for various procedures and sometimes independently conduct portions of
the research. While students and postdocs come and go, technicians and managers
are often continuing, sometimes lifetime, members of the laboratory. Experimental
procedures are not necessarily distributed by status, and thus the work of a bench
scientist can be considered an occupation ðspecialized labor that constitutes the
basis of continual opportunity for employment; Weber 1947, p. 250Þ, although or-
ganizational status varies widely ðe.g., student, postdoc, technician, professorÞ.
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routinely felt compelled to misrepresent the number of hours they had
driven in their hour logbooks ðwhich are reviewed by regulatorsÞ so as to
appear compliant with regulatory limits on driving hours. Employee truck-
ers, rather than owner-operator truckers, often stated that their employers
knew ðand expectedÞ that noncompliance was needed to ensure on-time
product delivery and that “lying on the books” was common. From the
truckers’ perspective, the regulators were enforcing the rules legalistically
ðFriedman andLadinsky 1967Þ and unreasonably because they neglected to
account for actual work conditions; the regulators were also unreasonable
because they ignored truckers’ frequent efforts to comply with safety reg-
ulations. The creation of false documents and situationally constrained ef-
forts to comply extended the threat from the regulator-regulated relationship
to the manager-employee relationship: lying on the logbooks was done not
only to achieve product delivery within demanded time frames and avoid
regulatory punishment but, more fundamentally, so that drivers could se-
cure continued employment. As one Florida truck driver notes, “The com-
pany puts pressure on drivers to get loads delivered on time.” Another
trucker, from Connecticut, pointed out that “you cannot do the logbook
legally and make appointments. The problem is to make the logbook ‘look
correct’ . . . you have to do it, you just can’t speed up” ðand record your
speed accuratelyÞ. And, ﬁnally, a company driver from Virginia admitted
that there are times when you need to “throw the logbook in the back when
running out of time. If you were to run legal it would be hard to make a
living.”
The circumstances of looking compliant were different for the factory
workers and truck drivers when compared to those in the university labs,
as the former faced more transparent and energetic power dynamics at
work with middle-level managers ði.e., factory supervisors and truck dis-
patchersÞ. These direct supervisors, controlling the workers’ continued em-
ployment, contributed to the view of regulators as threats. According to a
truck driver from Missouri, “Top management spouts safety big time. But
dispatchers ½middle-level managers are rewarded for ‘on-time delivery’ and
production. Touting safety and telling everyone to be safe. It’s one thing for
them to say it. But, they make rewards ½for dispatchers come into direct
conﬂict ½with trucker safety. We deal with many dispatchers over many
shifts. The pressure is not so much from daytime dispatcher but from off-
shift dispatchers. Off-shift dispatchers say things that ‘sound like they want
you to bend the rules.’”Another truck driver, an owner-operator, noted that
while he may have independent control, he is not fully independent as he
must still workwith dispatchers. “I still feel pressure,might not be as hard as
company drivers. Where I have a right to refuse a load, they don’t. Com-
panydrivers don’t have a right to refuse a load, forced by a dispatcher,while119
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AlI am not forced by a dispatcher.” A Virginia company driver of 21 years
observed that among company drivers, it is worse for those lower in the
hierarchy with less authority as “the dispatchers keep pushing the young
guys, and they keep going.”
The creation of “looking compliant” behaviors inside organizations
highlights the gap between what is formally expected and performed for an
audience and the routine production of work. The success of these cho-
reographed alterations, the Potemkin villages, serves to perpetuate what is
often described as institutional homogeneity—homologies among organi-
zations or looking alike—but they turn out to be merely ceremonial com-
pliance practices ðMeyer and Rowan 1977Þ. While the threat associated
with inspections also gave rise to Potemkin villages in the university labs,
there were opportunities for different constructions of the regulator to
develop. The middle persons inside the university labs were less adver-
sarial in comparison to the factory supervisors and truck driver super-
visors ði.e., the dispatchersÞ. While inspections were considered a threat
across all our settings, it is important to ask under what circumstances
within organizations regulators might become interpreted as either an ally
for, or an obstacle to, good governance.Regulator as Ally
When organizational actors construct the regulator as an ally, there is, if
not an explicit, an implicit, tacit understanding that regulators are willing
to work with the organization through a set of continuing relationships in
which legal agents and organizational actors collaborate to produce com-
pliance. When experienced, interpreted, and responded to as an ally, the
regulator is acknowledged to possess relevant expertise: knowledge of the
speciﬁc and technical work of the organization, a range of possibly alter-
native compliant processes, the formal legal requirements, and a range of
legal options. A regulator might function as an ally during ofﬁcial inspec-
tions or audits but may also serve as a backstage ally, who can be consulted,
perhaps conﬁdentially and certainly unofﬁcially, if a regulatory issue be-
comes problematic among members within the organization or within the
regulatory agency. In these situations, regulators are treated as resources
available for internal management of uncertainty and risk. For many reg-
ulators, this is how they wish to be seen by organizational actors. Indeed,
this is the conception of regulation underlying the model of responsive
regulation ðAyres and Braithwaite 1992Þ.
Compliance ofﬁcers who develop collaborative relationships with the
regulated are more often closely situated in time and space to provide as-
sistance to the regulated ðsee Frenkel and Scott 2002; Locke, Qin, and
Brause 2007Þ. That is, they are physically proximate, have lower caseloads,120
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Coslovsky 2011; Huising and Silbey 2011; Pires 2011Þ. However, simply
as a matter of interactional efﬁciency and limited time, collaborative re-
lationships with regulators cannot be formed with all organizational ac-
tors, so that the ally construction is unlikely to be widely shared across the
organization ðexcept through circulating narratives rather than ﬁrsthand
experiencesÞ. Indeed, collaborative relationships with regulators were un-
heard of among the frontline factory workers and truck drivers. In our ﬁeld
research, we observed that actors with a distinguishing degree of technical
expertise and organizational autonomy themselves were more likely to re-
gard the regulator as an ally if there was a continuous set of transactions.
Other actors in that setting, however, tended to continue to construct the
regulator as a threat or an obstacle. For example, environmental, health,
and safety ðEHSÞ agents within the university administration developed
ongoing relationships with lawyers in the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ðEPAÞ in whose jurisdiction the university was located. The uni-
versity EHS agents, who function as internal compliance staff, interpreted
the EPA lawyers as allies, while others continued to see them as threats.
University safety ofﬁcers/compliance staff share with some laboratory
workers ðsome graduate students and postdoctoral fellowsÞ a good mea-
sure of expertise and have relatively greater organizational autonomy than
do students and technicians; they regularly interact with government in-
spectors ðor postdocs with internal regulators/compliance staffÞ, coming to
regard these regulatory actors as allies in the effort to minimize laboratory
risks and ensure safe working conditions ðEvans 2010Þ. Although alliances
among regulatory actors ðwithin the organization andwith the government
regulatorsÞ would seem predictable, it was not always the case. Variations
in expertise, relative autonomy, and frequency of interaction with external
regulators were more inﬂuential than positional titles and roles for internal
compliance ofﬁcers’ interpretations of government regulators and regula-
tions ðSilbey, Huising, and Coslovsky 2009Þ.
With a team of graduate students, Susan Silbey conducted an ethno-
graphic study as Eastern University developed amanagement system ðMSÞ
for containing EHS hazards in its research laboratories. The MS was part
of a negotiated agreement with the EPA following an inspection of the
laboratories. Although the EPA had not recorded one spill, emission, or
instance of environmental damage, the agency faulted the university for
not having a documented system for managing laboratory hazards and
for not being able to account for the variation in compliance or violations
that the EPA observed among the many laboratories inspected. The uni-
versity’s attorney and chief risk manager, along with several compliance
managers ðe.g., the head of environmental programs and the director of the
EHS OfﬁceÞ, were obligated to meet semiannually with EPA staff attor-121
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Alneys to develop the MS in accordance with terms of the negotiated con-
sent decree.
Going beyond the required semiannual meetings, the university com-
pliance managers regularly met and consulted with the EPA lawyers. The
university’s attorney, however, was not present at these meetings, during
which the EHS compliance managers often sought advice about alterna-
tive models for policies, programs, and procedures they were developing.
For example, as part of the EHS-MS, the university was required to create
a pollution prevention program. As the committee designing the system
began to work on the pollution prevention component, the requirements
became indeterminate, as was often the case with each of the consent de-
cree’s mandates. So the committee members met with the EPA attorney to
discuss possible alternative ways that the design committee had come up
with to reduce consumption of potentially polluting substances. They in-
quired about the decree’s language to see what room for maneuver and
degrees of freedom they had. For instance, would the inventory system they
were developing, combined with research on alternative, less toxic sol-
vents, and a program to encourage adoption of these alternative solvents,
meet the goal of a pollution prevention program? In the course of these
back-and-forth discussions, the university compliance managers estab-
lished an easygoing, almost collegial relationship that involved ongoing
dialogue about the university’s local culture, resources, and pragmatic con-
siderations; at the same time they would often exchange stories about other
universities’ and public entities’ struggles with environmental compliance.11
Although the EPA attorneys would not prescribe what should be done and
how the EHS-MS should look in its details, they were a source of informa-
tion about what other institutions were doing, how one procedure worked
better than another, and under what conditions.
The EPA did not have a script for compliance. The entire purpose of
creating a management system to achieve sustainable environmental
health and safety was premised on the notion that the university had to
institute means of self-observation and the capacity to respond by and for
itself. The central trope here is of a regulatory mechanism that will bring
routine practices and behavior within acceptable boundaries, similar to a
thermostat. Although all parties were ostensibly bound by the governing
federal ðand state and localÞ statutes, as well as the court-sanctioned con-
sent decree, the EPA attorney’s stance was more pedagogical and in-
formational than prescriptive or proscriptive. Moreover, the EPA did not
expect perfectly uniform performance. It acknowledged the inevitable11 Interestingly, few of the stories ever involved references to proﬁt-making orga-
nizations. It was as if there was an agreement to share information within a
boundary of relevant compatriot organizations.
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Not infrequently, these conversations were punctuated by humorous quips
about the administration in Washington as well as the difﬁculties of man-
aging arrogant professors. Each side of the table offered confessions con-
cerning their most intransigent colleagues. The EPA and university man-
agers had become allies in the effort to herd the scientiﬁc cats of academia,
working together to develop a system that would produce safer and more
environmentally sustainable research laboratories.
In contrast, throughout the duration of the consent decree, Eastern’s
attorney interacted with and anticipated interactions with the EPA quite
differently. He rarely spoke with EPA attorneys outside the semiannual
reports; his transactions were scripted and curt. When he prepared docu-
ments, he assumed that they would be interpreted to the detriment of the
university. Although an attorney should anticipate that opposing parties
may exploit textual lacunae and indeterminacies to serve their interests,
experienced attorneys usually adjust their expectations to the particular
situation, learning through the various transactions what the work style of
the opposing lawyer is, and what kinds of responses to expect, and they
adjust tactics accordingly. When negotiations are successful, this can be a
process of mutual exploration and adjustment. The university’s attorney
had successfully negotiated with this EPA attorney what the university
leadership assessed to be a very reasonable settlement. Yet, even as the
development of the EHS-MS proceeded, and even into the ﬁnal weeks of
the consent decree’s time frame, the university’s attorney adopted an ad-
versarial stance with the EPA. At times, he became so distrusting and
hostile that the university’s compliance managers found themselves re-
peatedly engaged in repair work with the EPA attorneys. Expressing dis-
appointment in this variation in treatment from the university’s agents ðthe
attorney as compared to the managers with whom he alliedÞ, the EPA
attorney said one day, “Doesn’t he see the person behind the role?Who does
he think he is dealing with? Haven’t we been working on this for years
now? Am I the enemy?” To the university’s attorney, the EPA was the
enemy, a threat rather than an ally. Here, an internal compliance ofﬁcer
with almost complete autonomy—the university attorney—lacking tech-
nical expertise in the hazards and infrequently interacting with the EPA
personnel did not form alliances or regard the external regulators as allies,
as did some of the other internal compliance staff. Thus, internal compli-
ance staff may themselves be either compliance promoting or compliance
limiting, depending, we argue, not on their formal position alone but on their
expertise, autonomy, and interactional frequency with the regulators.
In the factory and among the truck drivers, the view of regulators as
an ally was rare or absent. We observed an organizational space or a gap
otherwise occupied by middle persons between frontline workers and reg-123
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Alulators. Lacking such positions among the truckers and factory workers
themselves limited interactions between frontline workers and regulators,
preventing ongoing transactions that might have led to familiarity with
regulators and possible alliances. This gapwas occupied bymiddle persons,
which inside the factory sometimes included factory supervisors or team
leaders and, among the truckers, their supervisor dispatchers. Inside or-
ganizations, middle persons may, through their interactions with employ-
ees, be compliance promoting or compliance limiting. Lacking meaning-
ful collaborative interactions with regulators and experiencing such rare
encounters through the performance of Potemkin villages, they viewed the
regulator as a threat more than an ally. A framework of individual re-
sponsibility and self-regulation prevailed whereby employees and employ-
ers were expected to collaboratively work together in the absence of direct
regulator involvement. Inside the factory, which was unionized, workers
were often forced to rely on compliance-promoting middle persons such as
union safety representatives. Frontline factoryworkers were able to interact
meaningfully with a regulator only if they secretly went above their super-
visor and forced a work refusal that eventually led to the appearance of a
regulator.
Rare end runs around middle-level actors set the stage for a defensive
posturing by compliance-limiting middle persons who regarded frontline
workers’ interactions with regulators, by themselves, as threatening. For
instance, during a departmental staff meeting inside the factory, an engi-
neer instructor told workers, “It’s your responsibility to say something if
you don’t feel you have been properly trained, that includes safety.” This
led to a heated discussion with a former team leader ðwho once served as
acting supervisor in the factoryÞ, who responded by saying, “If a worker,
especially a summer student, does complain, they get labeled and get put on
a different shit job, and are possibly not hired back the next summer.” This
comment appeared to ﬁt with the ﬁeldwork observations of Gray and com-
ments made by other workers during the course of the study concerning re-
percussions for reporting safety violations or being too concerned about
safety. However, rather than address the implicit issue of the role of hier-
archy in demands for individual responsibility, that is, conditions under
which the worker could reasonably exercise individual responsibility, the
instructor jokingly dismissed the comment—illegitimate within and con-
trary to the instruction being offered—by saying that the former acting su-
pervisor was just “bitching and complaining.”
Compliance-limiting middle persons perpetuate the regulator as a threat,
rather than an ally, by themselves posing the threat of terminating em-
ployment. Rather than foster collaborative regulatory relationships with
frontline staff, compliance-promoting and compliance-limiting middle-
persons create a buffer through which frontline workers with low levels of124
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interpretation of regulators as obstacles, to be discussed in the next section,
varied across both blue-collar and white-collar settings among workers
with different levels of authority and autonomy.
A cautionary note.—The construction of the regulator as an ally can
be volatile and can sometimes backﬁre, disrupting organizational relations
and positions rather than helping to mediate internal problems, as evi-
denced by the need for whistle-blower protection. In other words, organi-
zational members sometimes risk retaliation when they regard the regula-
tor as an ally and act on this construction by requesting the assistance of
the regulator without support from organizational leadership ðGray 2006,
2009; Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove 2008Þ. This risk becomes even more
ampliﬁedwith the prospect of regulatory capture ðLaffont andTirole 1991Þ.
As Ayres and Braithwaite ð1991, pp. 437–38Þ caution, “the very condi-
tions that foster the evolution of cooperation are also the conditions that
promote the evolution of capture and indeed corruption . . . ongoing re-
lationships ½also permit the slow pounding out of the corruptibility and
trustworthiness of the other to stand by corrupt bargains” ðsee also Gray
2013Þ. Paying attention, as we do, to variations in hierarchical position,
regulatory capture would also more likely limit actors with less authority
and autonomy from exerting agency inside organizations. Although our
research provided only positive outcomes of the regulator as ally construc-
tion, we nevertheless note that other research may document the darker
side of alliances between regulators and the regulated.Regulator as an Obstacle
In some cases, organization members interpret a regulatory agent as nei-
ther an ally nor a threat. Actors regard the regulator as an obstacle to
compliance when the regulator is believed to lack expert knowledge about
the organization’s work processes or has insufﬁcient additional resources
or status to engage organizational actors. The regulator may have designed
compliance requirements that are inadequately connected to the underly-
ing regulatory goals, as it appeared when the university committee tried to
implement the requirement to create a pollution prevention program. Or
the regulator may be unable to provide meaningful guidance and engage-
ment that works to orient an organization’s work processes towardmeeting
regulatory goals. With regard to the pollution prevention program, the
EPA attorneys shared information about other universities’ programs, pro-
viding additional grounds for the university staff to regard the EPA lawyers
as allies.
In our ﬁeld research, we noted that regulators were interpreted as ob-
stacles by organizational actors who possessed expertise and autonomy but125
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Allittle direct or frequent interaction with regulatory agents. The obstacle
construction did not necessarily vary exclusively with the worker’s social
status or technical position, as expertise and autonomy were not located
exclusively in high-status occupations or roles. Thus, sometimes a gradu-
ate student or postdoc might interpret the regulators as ill informed while
other graduate students or postdocs might form alliances because they in-
teracted more regularly with the inspectors. Rather, it was organizational
actors’ claim of expertise ðsense of their own competenceÞ plus the infre-
quent interaction that seemed to be associated with viewing the regulator
as an obstacle. Experienced truckers and factory workers, for instance, of-
ten had little respect for the inspectors if they found them to lack aware-
ness of “what really goes on at work,” just as the principal investigators,
usually professors, in the university labs had little respect for the “nonsci-
entist” regulators. In addition to having some degree of expertise and au-
tonomy, workers who constructed the regulator as an obstacle also tended
to haveminimal or no face-to-face interactions with the government agents.
Their relationship to regulatory requirements and regulators themselves
was mediated by forms, such as reporting and accounting documents, or by
staff assistants. To the degree, however, that the actor possessed a notice-
able degree of independent authority and was less subject to organizational
control, he or she was more likely to interpret the regulator as an obstacle
than as a threat. In other words, positional autonomy insulated the actor
from the perils of punishment.
Thus, we observed that interpretations of the regulator as an obstacle
were manifested in ways unique to the organizational setting. For example,
compliance is often veriﬁed by regulators by observing physical conditions,
using standard checklists and documents. Many regulations prescribe re-
quired actions within the work environment, while others prohibit speciﬁc
activities. Regulators conduct inspections to see if, for instance, factory em-
ployees are working with machine guarding, truck driver logbooks record
that drivers are not exceeding the time limits behind the wheel, or students
are consuming food in a laboratory. However, this simple mandate-and-
inspect approach tends to be completely disconnected from how rule fol-
lowing is accomplished in any particular organizational setting. Thus, it ne-
glects the diffuse pressures and institutional complexities experienced by
those inside organizations.
For example, the truck drivers interviewed by Gray frequently refer-
enced the inadequacy of the 14-hour driving limit imposed by the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation. This was mentioned above in our discussion of
the regulator as a threat because truckers created documents purporting to
show that they drove only within a 14-hour window within every 24 hours
ðleaving 10 consecutive hours within each 24-hour period in nonoperation
modeÞ. Because truckers feared regulators who would revoke their license126
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Governing Inside the Organizationfor driving beyond the legal limit of hours behind the wheel, they created
logbooks documenting compliance with the regulations. The regulators were
not only a threat to the truckers but an obstacle to doing the work of pick-
ing up and delivering goods. The regulators, according to the truckers, had
no idea how trucking was done, how much stopping and resting and
driving took place within what the logbook demanded as a recorded driv-
ing time. For instance, at the end of the 14-hour window, the truck driver
must “ﬁnd a safe place to sleep.” Yet, a trucker from Pennsylvania notes
that “many signs say no overnight parking and ½the warehouses I deliver
to don’t let you stay overnight. . . . ½In addition, some low-income neigh-
borhood areas can be pretty violent. I try to wait to go into those areas when
it is daylight, when it is a bit safer.” In other words, following the 14-hour
rule creates obstacles and problems with following other rules and reg-
ulations, as well as creating an obstacle to remaining safe while working.
The following 49-year-old truck driver from Texas discussed how metic-
ulously following the legally prescribed driving hours led to one fearful
night with little rest ðleading to increased sleep deprivation during the next
14-hour driving windowÞ:All uJust recently I felt one of the most uncomfortable situations while down on the
Philadelphia harbor, at one of the ports. I had to stay overnight. The gentle-
man whose dock I was in told me I would be safe but mentioned that it wasn’t
going to sound like you were safe. ½There would be lots of noise. And he was
correct. It sounded like a war was going on down there, the police sirens and
ﬁre engines and several gunshots. The whole area just didn’t feel safe but DOT
½Department of Transportation hours of service had been locked ½into the log,
so I couldn’t go, I had to take a 10-hour break there. And, unfortunately, there
was not any truck stops close by that I could legally get to and I couldn’t take
the chance of getting a ticket so I stayed. . . . I didn’t get any rest that night. All
that stuff was just too uncomfortably close. Whatever was taking place, they
were looking for bad guys. It was to me one of the most unsafe nights, and
I’ve spent nights down in the Bronx in NYC and that doesn’t bother me. . . .
It’s very hard to ﬁnd a parking spot, both safe from quote unquote “bad guys”
and safe as in from “law enforcement, enforcement codes, any of that.”Many interviews noted that the driving hour limit overlooked opportu-
nities in which drivers stopped to rest or had to spend a number of hours
waiting at a customer’s loading/off-loading site. According to the regula-
tion, this time had to be included in their 14-hour driving time period, and
not surprisingly, drivers felt that it unfairly reduced the critical driving
time they had to spend on the road. According to a senior truck driver who
has spent the past 33 years on the road, this has also led to a rise in truck
drivers taking shortcuts in bathroom breaks, with ecological consequences:Your logbook keeps running if stuck in trafﬁc. . . . No time to go to the bath-
room. Used to be able to go off-duty and take 15 minutes to pull over to go to127
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All use sthe rest stop. Increased use in pee bottles now in the last four or ﬁve years. If
you take three breaks in a day that’s 45 minutes lost, money out of pocket. And
the company is more demanding about putting the loads in the logbook frame.
I carry my own lunch/microwave with me because I can’t afford to stop. I get
drowsy in the afternoon but have to drive through it. A ½trucking friend of
mine was killed. He used to take six power drinks a day trying to ½stay awake
and make deliveries.12Over time, this produced expectations among drivers and their managers
that the logbooks could be manipulated, serving as one example of a social
outcome of a poorly designed regulation. Coupling the social dynamics of
driving, biological functions, trafﬁc, and street crime with the practical in-
adequacies of the regulation, many drivers have felt compelled to misrep-
resent their driving hours, and this has served to perpetuate regulators’ un-
awareness of the issue.
As regulatory rules become more complex and compliant behavior be-
comes less easily scripted, compliance may become difﬁcult to observe ex-
cept when the system fails ðVaughan 1996, 2003; Perrow 1999Þ. The range
of information that may be relevant, and the range of knowledge that may
be available, often make complete or formal speciﬁcation of the proper
conduct of work difﬁcult.13 The inability to prescribe completely what is
needed for responsible or adequate work practice is what has traditionally
differentiated, in large part, layers in the stratiﬁcation of status, authority,
and autonomy in work ðWeber 1997Þ. When regulations govern practices
with multiple actors, actions, and alternative pathways, such as in the case
of ensuring patient safety ðSinger et al. 2011Þ, practicing tax law ethically
and legally ðRostain 1998Þ, or conducting biological research, regulators are
no longer able to observe directly whether regulations are being followed.
Instead, regulators are left to determine whether a desired level of safety
was achieved by reviewingwhatever had been recorded and documented of
the work practices, as opposed to making this determination on the basis ofe issue of job stress related to the legal driving limits for truck drivers has
lted in an ecological issue for those who must pick up roadside trash. According
e media report, a small county in Washington reported having to pick up in
one year 2,666 bottles of urine, many of them being “trucker bombs, plastic
full of urine tossed by truckers” ðhttp://www.nbcnews.com/id/7912464/ns/us
s-environment/t/urine-trouble-some-states-warn-truckers/#.VDvwTk10xjoÞ.
wever, see Gawande’s ð2009Þ discussion of the safe surgical checklist that re-
es that at three different points during the surgery process—ðiÞ before induction
nesthesia, ðiiÞ before skin incision, and ðiiiÞ before the patient leaves the op-
ing room—the nurse, anesthesiologist, and surgeon communicate with each
r by conﬁrming the checking of boxes on a list designed to assist in reducing
ical errors and, in turn, surgical morbidity and mortality. The utility of check-
for diverse complex activities is beginning to be explored more systematically,
varying results ðLyneis 2012Þ.
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Governing Inside the Organizationdirectly observed behaviors or inspected physical spaces and objects. Thus,
regulators become auditors enforcing complex rules ðStrathern 2000; Power
2003; Robson et al. 2012Þ, but they also pay special attention to negative
outcomes as indicators not of random events but of poor practices. Conse-
quently, there is a persistent separation between what the regulator can
detect through records and indicators and what actions and dynamical
processes take place in work practices as well as in the creation of the rec-
ords ðSilbey 1980–81Þ. This is exacerbated if the regulator lacks the exper-
tise to understand complex decision making in high-skill areas. As a result,
regulators are unable to assist meaningfully in compliance, and they are
often interpreted as obstacles by accomplished and expert actors.
Our research in university laboratories provided abundant examples
of scientists describing regulators—both compliance managers within the
university and inspectors from government agencies—not as merely ob-
stacles but as incompetent. At the most general level, the scientists explain
that the standard state and federal environmental health and safety reg-
ulations that have been written for industrial plants can never work in re-
search laboratories. Industrial sites carry out the same activities over and
over again. Because of the repetitive actions, the practices of industrial
safety can, like the work, also be routinized. They can be easily scripted for
both performance and monitoring by the organization and the govern-
ment inspectors.14 In contrast to industrial production, the scientists claim,
research laboratories, especially nonbiological laboratories, perform a vast
array of different activities, some of them infrequently and many only one
time. Research laboratories also typically perform these acts on a consid-
erably smaller scale, using small quantities of chemicals of nonetheless po-
tentially hazardous materials. Because of the variation in processes, low
volumes, and infrequency, it is difﬁcult to anticipate the kinds of dan-
gers and the substances that might turn out to be risky. “There are lots
of things,” one of the chemists said, “for which hazards are not known.
They’re new substances we’ve created as part of our research. And so . . .
the laws that are being applied to us really are not relevant.” In other
words, the dangers that attach to research laboratories are to a signiﬁcant
degree unspeciﬁable in advance. And the regulators cannot possibly un-
derstand or know what is happening, what is being created in the labo-
ratories, unless they, too, are research scientists. Our informant contin-
ued, “Chemists understand chemistry, and also the health effects and other
things much more. . . . We understand why something’s carcinogenic, we
understand why something is corrosive, we understand things like that.14Of course, this is not so. Studies of industrial safety attest to the difﬁculty of
achieving safe work conditions in complex production processes ðPerrow 1999;
Silbey 2009; Lyneis 2012Þ.
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AlWell, in our minds, that elevates the respect for the hazards.” After all,
how could the regulators know what should be done if the scientists are
creating new knowledge?
The scientists’ default position is to regard the regulators’ interventions
as irrelevant if not detrimental for the laboratory, for which only the sci-
entist creators have adequate knowledge. Notably, the scientists often ex-
pressed these opinions having had little or no face-to-face interaction with
the regulators. The regulator as an obstacle is a circulating trope produced
from diverse sources: public media about regulation, apocryphal stories
that travel among colleagues, instructions from university administrators,
the training requirements of the management system, and reports from stu-
dents and postdocs in the labs. If, however, scientists can reinterpret the
regulators’ rules and interventions within scientiﬁc concepts and protocols,
they may be persuaded to adopt a more compliant posture.
Interestingly, from the researchers’ perspective, the regulators’ deﬁcien-
cies were not only scientiﬁc, which we might expect, but also bureaucratic
and legal. Often the lab members could not understand what the compli-
ance managers and by implication the government regulators expected of
them. While the technicians fretted about this, worrying about being pun-
ished ðEvans 2010Þ, the professors and senior scientists delegated these
concerns to subordinates but also complained about what they saw as the
nonsense expressed in the rules. For example, the regulations of the 1976
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ð40 CFR, pts. 260–80Þ require
that, until removed off site, that is, out of the laboratory and then within
90 days off campus, waste must be kept in a “satellite accumulation area,”
at the place of generation, in the laboratory, with one active container per
waste streamof up to 55 gallons or one quart of acutely hazardouswaste. All
waste must be labeled with a tag provided by the contractor. The label
must indicate what type of wastematerial is enclosed ðe.g., “waste acetone”Þ
as well as the associated hazards ðe.g., “ignitable”Þ and the date. The de-
scription must be in English, not in diagrams of molecular structure or
chemical symbols. The containers must be situated so that the labels are
clearly visible. All containers must be in good condition and all jars capped.
Although this latter requirement seems simple and basic enough, it was
impossible to understand, according to the scientists:130
l use sWhat does it mean capped? How tightly capped? Acids cannot be tightly
capped or they will explode. What does it mean all jars must be capped? If
72 of the 75 unsealed chemicals in the lab are capped, will we be cited for
noncompliance? How can my graduate students possibly know? They are
going to say 72 out of 75 is good enough. And so I don’t know. Then what
happens? You get an enormous amount of information in some central data-
base, where someone is sitting with their feet on the desk in their ofﬁce, likeThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 04, 2016 10:35:45 AM
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All umonitoring their computer. . . . I mean they’re people. I don’t know. . . .What
are they going to do, sit around looking at this highly edited, uncertain in-
formation, provided by graduate students, which is a very crude level and de-
termine if we are compliant?The inspection and auditing forms, tools designed to help the regulators
work trying to encourage, if not ensure, compliance, were regarded as in-
adequate, if not silly. As a consequence, senior scientists and professors
would avoid calling the compliance staff for help until accidents occurred.
Short of an accident, they delegated to their students and staff the work of
meeting regulatory requirements. Sometimes, however, they tried to man-
age on their own. One university administrator told us a story about how he
had to mediate between a faculty member and compliance staff. Our ﬁeld
notes read:Dave told me a longer story about what is a typical problem between com-
pliance managers and faculty. A member of the x department had a cracked
ﬂoor tile in his ofﬁce and decided that he would ﬁx it himself. When he pried
up the tile, he discovered there was asbestos and called the environmental,
health and safety ofﬁce for help. The EHS people came in and apparently some-
thing happened during the exchange—Dave was unsure what—whereby the
professor kicked them out. They decided to seal his ofﬁce, and exclude him for a
week. Dave ended up in the middle, mediating between the two by having the
facilities department ðe.g., carpenters andpaintersÞ rather thanhazardouswaste
or safety ðEHSÞ deal with it. During the afternoon of the ﬁrst day, the ﬂoor was
sealed and the professor had meetings there—that is why he had kicked them
out. Within a few hours on the next day, the ﬂoor was repaired. But the EHS
staff ði.e., compliance managersÞ would not come back and the professor would
not move the furniture.That the compliance staff would not accommodate the professor’s sched-
ule was evidence to him that they were not merely a threat because they
were intent on punishing him, that is, sealing his ofﬁce, but that they did not
understand the university’s priorities, at least as he understood them. That
the professor posed a signiﬁcant risk conﬁrmed to the compliance staff that
they needed to use their full authority and threaten to close him down.
Thus, we have here an example of multiple possible interpretations. The
regulatory staff were obstacles to important work, inadequate as university
members, and thus posed a threat to its basic function. The administrator
could get the situation resolved, within hours, because he was well con-
nected within the university community and familiar with its diverse inter-
nal networks and resources. The professor could normally ignore the reg-
ulators because he had no fear that they could damage his position.15hile tenured faculty occupy quite privileged positions with protected employ-
t and major roles in the governance of their organizations, not all professors are
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AlDISCUSSION
Whether we call it the regulatory state, the risk society, or the audit culture,
we live in a world in which hazards are produced as often by the action
of complex organizations as by persons of ﬂesh and blood, and where the
scale of damage is often proportional to the size of the organizational actor.
Rather than a phenomenal entity, however, these complex organizations
are constituted through the interactions of long chains of loosely rather than
tightly coupled action. Because organizations pose such substantial risks to
the health and welfare of employees and the public and to the larger na-
tional and global economy, they are highly regulated by state law as well
as by organizational protocols and artifacts. Although these organizations
are usually depicted in terms of hierarchical or networked lines of authority
and delegation, sociologists have long observed the myriad unscripted, in-
terstitial practices that produce both the intended and the unintended or-
ganizational outcomes.
Large-scale, complex organizations rely on diverse techniques of sur-
veillance, review, and revision as well as interpersonal trust and direct ob-
servation to govern themselves, that is, to achieve organizational goals
and ﬁdelity to legal rules. Yet, the literature on organizational compliance,
as well as the popular press and political discourse, is replete with examples
of organizations that fail to manage themselves so as to comply with legal
regulations or meet organizational goals. Observers note that the legal and
administrative apparatus for the social control of organizations has, itself,
failed to adequately take account of and respond to the organized causes
of organizational misconduct ðVaughan 1999Þ. Instead, focusing on bad
actors, “amoral calculators” ðKagan and Scholz 1984Þ, or environmental
pressures, much of the existing literature has looked either at the indi-
viduals within ﬁrms and regulatory agencies or at the organization as a
whole—the corporate person. If one adopts an individualist, microlevel of
analysis, which is most common, punishment and deterrence are recom-
mended to secure compliance. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests that
when the organization is the unit of analysis, even where individual prose-
cution is pursued, recidivist organizational noncompliance persists, with
little consensus in the literature as to the causal mechanisms.equal. Although many universities defend and protect faculty from external social
control to a far greater degree than may be typical of other organizations, faculty
“stars” whose public and professional accomplishments contribute disproportion-
ately to a university’s prestige and status are accorded an even greater sphere of
autonomy. Thus, our data contain numerous examples of scientists whose labo-
ratories failed safety inspections. If the faculty member was, however, a “star,”
university staff would often do the remedial work rather than insist that the faculty
member do it.
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Governing Inside the OrganizationIn this article, we have taken a different approach. Instead of looking
at individual actors as moral, immoral, or amoral calculators, we look in-
side organizations at where and how individuals are located within the
hierarchy. We note how groups of actors are differentially able to act au-
tonomously ðor notÞ, endowed with technical expertise ðor notÞ, and ex-
perienced familiarity with regulations and regulators ðor notÞ. Rather than
rest on either side of an unfruitful divide ðindividual person vs. organiza-
tion as actorÞ, we identify the sources of variation in organizational gov-
ernance in terms of the hierarchical structure and distribution of resources
ði.e., autonomy, expertise, experienceÞ and thus bridge the gap between an
individualist, micro account of organizational failure as propounded in the
bad actor models and macro accounts of the organization qua organization
as the actor or unit of analysis.
Recognizing that occupational variation and stratiﬁcation play as large
a role in organizational governance as do rules and norms, we followed
actors at different locations in the organizational hierarchy to observe their
interactions with regulators and regulations. As the preceding analysis
shows, actors within the same organization, and often the same occupation,
developed varying interpretations of regulations that often aligned with
their positions, expertise, and familiarity with the regulators: as a threat to
their employment, as an ally with whom they could work to achieve orga-
nizational and public goals, or as an obstacle to the entire enterprise. How-
ever, we also noticed that these variations within one organization were
repeated in the interpretations by actors in other organizations when the
actors occupied similar statuses across the different occupations, and dif-
ferent organizations, both proﬁt-making ﬁrms and nonproﬁt universities
and hospitals.
Kellogg’s ð2011Þ study of the implementation of regulations limiting sur-
geons’ hours of work provides a useful counterfactual example, illustrating
the utility of our typology. Both hospitals Kellogg studied “faced similar
environmental pressures, they had similar organizational characteristics
and similar top-manager interest in change, and they designed very similar
compliance programs to respond to the regulation” ðp. 32Þ. In both hospi-
tals, ﬁrst-year residents wanted to be compliant with the regulation ðas it
meant that they were to work only 80 hours as opposed to 120 hours a
weekÞ, but they had relatively limited authority or autonomy and no direct
interaction with the regulators.
Given that the new residents, whowanted to comply and viewed the new
regulations as a beneﬁt to their work life, occupied a lower position in the
hierarchy, they had to deal with those above them in the hierarchy ðmiddle-
personsÞ to reorganize hospital routines and work schedules, just as our
employee truck drivers had to deal with the compliance-limiting dispatch-
ers. Some senior surgeons and hospital directors regarded the new work133
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Alhour regulations as both a threat and an obstacle because the new work
hour regulations, they believed, would affect the quality of patient-centered
treatment as well as the development of “can do anything” professionalism
among the surgeons-in-training. And, in both hospitals, the directors who
sat high in the organizational hierarchy had originally avoided tracking
resident work hours for fear that this would give regulators evidence of
noncompliance. Hence, similarly to our truckers, these hospital directors
created Potemkin villages through manipulation of the work hour track-
ing systems. By not keeping track, there would be an illusion or a ceremo-
nial compliance with the regulation.
Because the residents in only one of the hospitals were able to achieve
lower work hours in compliance with the rule, it may seem that those in
similar positions in different hospitals are interpreting regulations differ-
ently. However, it turned out that in one hospital, staff across hierarchical
strata met in what Kellogg calls relational spaces ðe.g., lunchroomsÞ, where
they developed a common interpretation of the new rules. In effect, the
hierarchical divisions were breached in the relational spaces, where infor-
mation and varied experience with regulators were shared across lines of
differential expertise and autonomy. In the hospital where the rules were
not enforced, despite the residents’ interpretations of them as reasonable
and appropriate, there were no relational spaces where members from
all levels of the hospital were able to discuss options beyond ceremonial,
Potemkin-like compliance with the regulation. Although the formal posi-
tions across the organizations looked similar, the social interactions in the
hospitals differed so that the working organizational practices were not the
same and thus position was ceremonial rather than actual. In one organi-
zation, the social relations mitigate the effects of organizational hierarchy;
in the other, hierarchy was sustained and hindered those low in autonomy
and authority to engage in compliance-oriented behaviors. The varying
relations across the formal hierarchical strata illustrate the pivotal role
middle-level management plays in promoting and ensuring collaborative
relationships with regulators.
Similarly, all compliance staff within organizations do not interpret reg-
ulators or regulations the same way, as compliance ofﬁcers do not always
command similar authority, expertise, or familiarity with the regulators.
In the university, we reported how the head compliance ofﬁcer, the at-
torney, regarded the EPA regulators as obstacles to research and threats
to his status. The hazard specialists regarded the EPA as allies. The
attorney interacted much less frequently with the EPA staff and devel-
oped minimal expertise in the various laboratory hazards and practices.
This variation among compliance staff was also evident among some of
the hazard specialists. Thus, formal position and title alone do not predict
interpretations.134
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Governing Inside the OrganizationCONCLUSION
We often speak about the myriad of transactions that are undertaken on
behalf of or in the name of an organization as if the organization itself—
an aggregation of activities, symbols, resources—were an agential actor.
This personiﬁcation, or reiﬁcation, of the organization is achieved not only
by the structured coordination of action as a choreographed sequence to
achieve speciﬁed goals or by a concerted commitment to a set of values and
processes that extend beyond instrumental utilities ðSelznick 1969, p. 25;
Scott 2001, p. 23Þ, but also by the publicly circulating legal ﬁction of the
corporation as a person. As this personiﬁcation of the organization qua
organization is propagated, the diversity among the persons who perform
the organizational actions that constitute the links in the coordinated action
is also effaced. This is especially so in studies of regulatory compliance and
organizational governance generally. Thus, conventional studies designed
to explore regulatory relationships have taken a “regulator lens approach.”
This approach has led to a wealth of studies on how regulators view, or
ought to view, the regulated ﬁrm but, in turn, has had the unintended con-
sequence of overlooking what can be learned directly from actors inside
regulated organizations.
The erasure of persons in lieu of the organization as actor poses theo-
retical and empirical challenges to those who seek to channel or change
organizational behavior, in particular, through legal regulation. At the end
of the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, following an escalating series of
global ﬁnancial, economic, and environmental crises, we hear calls for a re-
turn to the more active government oversight and intervention that had
produced, in themid-20th century in theUnited States andWesternEurope,
the largest transfer of wealth and equalization of social status in recorded
history while also providing signiﬁcant increases in longevity, literacy, and
general health and well-being. The neoliberal policies of the last 40 years
deconstructed some of themost critical mechanisms of themodern regulatory
state that had been put in place prior to and just following World War II,
leaving in their wake an abundance of laws, regulations, rights, and organi-
zational forms that instantiate a plethora of inconsistencies and contra-
dictions as residues of a checkered history of 20th-century government reg-
ulation, organizational interests, and styles of governance. We also hear
abundant criticism of the regulatory, overreaching state. Although we risk
escalating crises by ignoring the lessons of history, the circumstances in
which we act are never exactly the same and the lessons not always crys-
tal clear. Thus, it is crucial to identify the conditions that distinguish regu-
latory successes and failures, across history and cultures.
This article proposes a ﬁrst step in the effort to better understand how
public regulation works by rejecting the treatment of the organization as a135
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Alunitary actor in debates concerning the efﬁcacy of public regulation and
probabilities of regulatory compliance. Looking at different actors within
organizations, all with roles and responsibilities governed by legal regu-
lations, we observed variations in the ways in which those organizational
actors talked about, anticipated, and responded to regulators and regula-
tions. We illustrate the ﬂip side of regulation: exploring how the regulated,
organizational actors subject to legal regulation understand, interpret, and
construct legal regulation and regulators. As the preceding analysis shows,
we identiﬁed three distinct accounts of theways inwhich regulators worked
with organizational actors: as threats to organizational performance be-
cause the regulator attempted to enforce the law regardless of the efforts
or intentions of the organizational actor, as an ally seeking to achieve the
public interests behind regulation by working in collaboration with the or-
ganizational actors, and as an obstacle to organizational production that
neither serves the public interest nor achieves compliance with regulations.
The proposed typology of the regulator as an ally, threat, and obstacle pro-
vides an alternative pathway to understanding the day-to-day practices of
regulatory compliance at the organizational level. It not only extends current
work on motivations of the regulated but also provides a theoretical ave-
nue to explore further how a responsive regulator, themost well-propagated
model, might actually perform in practice ðAyres and Braithwaite 1992Þ.
Exploring the “other side of the compliance relationship” ðGray and Sil-
bey 2011Þ, this also provides a microlevel approach to tracking institutional
patterns.
Although we create this typology by looking closely at actors at all ranks
inside the organizational settings, and not just the upper-level adminis-
trators or compliance managers, and ground the typology in variations we
observed in autonomy, expertise, and frequency of interaction with reg-
ulators, we do not associate the constructs with formal organizational po-
sitions or titles. That is, we have not yet systematically analyzed the data to
substantiate the intuition that these constructs may vary systematically
with organizational position, although our observations suggest the oppo-
site. We observed actors occupying the same middleman positions—as in-
ternal compliance ofﬁcers—who interpreted regulations differently; they
also displayed differences in technical expertise, autonomy, and frequency
of interaction with the regulators. This analysis suggests several hypothe-
ses, which offer lines of further research.
First, we hypothesize that the constructs of types of regulators will vary
with the expertise and autonomy of the organizational actor. Second, fre-
quency of interaction between the regulators and regulated will vary with
the expertise and autonomy of the organizational actors. We noted that the
interpretations of the regulator seemed to vary with the temporal pace and
directness of the relationship between the regulator and the organizational136
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organizational actor in a curvilinear fashion. Government regulators are
unlikely to spend much time with the lowest-level employees in the orga-
nization, as those employees are not routinely seen as self-directed, auton-
omous actors, but rather are subject to the job speciﬁcation, work processes,
and protocols established by management and overseen by supervisors.
Conversely, inspectors are unlikely to spendmuch timewith themost senior
personnel, as those at the top of the hierarchy have delegated responsibility
for implementation of organizational protocols and conformity with legal
rules to both staff and line actors. Thus, we expect that regulators will in-
teractmost frequentlywithmid-level actors in the organizational hierarchy.
Those positions are often occupied by persons who act with autonomy to
those below and with greater production expertise than the organization-
wide managers above them.
However, even if there is frequent interaction, regulators must be viewed
as credible. The world’s most high-proﬁle environmental disaster, the
British Petroleum oil spill, stands as a striking example of the importance of
regulatory capacity to understand sophisticated technologies. The BP oil
spill is being explained as the product of a series of systemic problems that
involve not only BP’s management practices but also the capacity and over-
sight problems among government regulators. A U.S. National Commission
ð2011Þ found that the Department of Interior’s Minerals Management Ser-
vice responsible for regulating offshore oil drilling had very little under-
standing of the technological operations of the drilling rigs and platforms
that theywereoverseeing.For instance, a co-commissioner explained, “When
we asked ½regulatory inspectors about cementing and centralizers they said
very freely, ‘We don’t know about that stuff; we have to trust the compa-
nies’ . . . all they get is on-the-job training. It really is fairly startling, con-
sidering how sophisticated the industry has become.”16 The lack of exper-
tise and knowledge of the BP oil regulators highlights the extreme potential
for damage that the regulator as obstacle construction might signal. Thus,
if we use the frequency and forms of interaction between regulators and
the organizational actor, the constructs of types of regulators are likely to
vary with the expertise and autonomy of the organizational actor. Our re-
search suggests that stratiﬁcation within the organization affects how reg-
ulators are constructed. Additional research should speciﬁcally test these
relationships.
Third, constructs of regulators are likely to affect patterns of compli-
ance. If the constructs—experiences and interpretations—of the regulators16Brett Dykes, “Some Oil Regulators Knew Nothing of Processes They Oversaw,
Panel Finds” ðhttp://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_upshot/20101027/bs_yblog_upshot
/oil-spill-commission-ﬁnds-that-drilling-regulators-often-knew-nothing-about-the
-processes-they-oversawÞ.
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Alvary by the autonomy, expertise of the organizational actors, and fre-
quency of interactions with inspectors and regulators, how does this in-
ﬂuence compliance with regulations? This is, after all, the ultimate concern
from any number of perspectives: understanding organizational gover-
nance, principal-agency dilemmas, institutional logics, or whether law
accomplishes its purposes. For example, for those who suggest that com-
peting cultural and institutional logics ðeither as part of the cultural script
or for a deliberate purposeÞ explain variations in decision making and or-
ganizational outcomes, this work suggests that researchers should explore
the organizational positions and resources of those articulating particular
logics. Does the logic contain assumptions that lead to regulators or reg-
ulations being viewed as a threat, ally, or obstacle? Are there logics that are
more embedded and tacitly understood in the local culture ðe.g., such as the
academic institutional logic that puts tenured faculty in positions of greater
autonomy and privilege unchecked by conventional organizational gov-
ernanceÞ? And, if so, what does this say about organizational hierarchy? In
addition, are there institutional logics that more closely align with positions
higher in the hierarchy ði.e., in the hospital, the logic of continual patient
care was held by those higher in the hierarchyÞ? When institutional logics
compete on aspects of regulation, what are the resources of those actors
inside the organization?
The typology offers a new starting point for going inside organizations
and exploring issues of regulatory compliance. If “it is in the crucible of
interactions that institutions are infused with meaning” ðHallett and Ven-
tresca 2006, p. 226Þ and the differential patterns of interaction within the
organization lead to varying constructions of regulation, wemight infer that
the capacity and agency of organizational actors to interpret and comply
with regulations will also vary. Future studies would proﬁtably explore
variations in compliance by patterns of stratiﬁcation within the organiza-
tion. For example, given the importance ofmiddle persons across both blue-
collar jobs ðfactory/truckingÞ and professional positions ðuniversity labsÞ,
future research may begin to map out the gap between frontline experi-
ence ðand interpretationsÞ and middle-level management with the goals of
regulators/regulations. Does the frontline regard the middle persons as a
threat, obstacle, or ally? Or, in another line of work on ethical standards of
research, we might look at how familiarity with the institutional review
boards, their practices, and criteria for implementing regulations affects
researchers’ interpretations and practices. Researchers with limited inter-
action with the ethics compliance ofﬁcers are more likely to interpret them
as a threat. This is very likely the case with students and novice research-
ers. If you do have transactions with the institutional review board but the
committee does not understand the science of the research, the researcher
is likely to interpret the board as an obstacle. However, with face-to-face138
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Governing Inside the Organizationinteractions and demonstrated credibility ðbased on our typologyÞ on the
part of the board person, researchers are more likely to interpret board
regulators as allies in ensuring the ethical conduct of research.
We conclude with a caution about using the typology for predicting
compliance and for law enforcement. Developing typologies is one of the
core marketing techniques used to target likely consumers; in law enforce-
ment, typologies are used to identify likely offenders and form the ground of
proﬁling. We are not advocating the use of this typology for identifying
locations of regulatory compliance or violation. Rather, we are suggesting
that organizational governance practices—whether about contract compli-
ance or government regulations—should take account of the differential
resources and capacities of organizational actors as contributing to and con-
stitutive of the organization’s ability to govern itself.REFERENCES
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